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If You Get Divorced in California, Can You Get Back from the House What You Put In

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Last Modified on Nov 18, 2026

California Family Code section 2640 states that when a divorce occurs, a spouse must “be reimbursed for the party’s contributions to the acquisition of property of the community estate to the extent the party traces the contributions to a separate property source”.

The way this works is to create an example.  Suppose a couple owns a California community property house worth $1,000,000.00.  There is a debt of $250,000.00 on it.  The parties sell the house.  Putting aside brokers fees, closing costs and the like, each party should get half of the proceeds, which in this case would come out to $375,000.00.  But suppose when the same couple first purchased the property, one of them – say the wife—used $100,000.00 of separate property funds to help with the downpayment.  If the wife can prove that this was the case, from the sales proceeds of $750,000.00, she gets the first $100,000.00.  The remaining $650,000.00 then gets divided equally.  So section 2640 results in a gain to the wife of $50,000.00.  (In other words, instead of splitting the $100,000.00 equally with the husband, which would be a gain to her of $50,000.00, she gets the full $100,000.00.  But this only works if the wife can prove that she made that $100,000.00 contribution.)  The longer the marriage –or the longer it has been since the house purchase—the harder it may be for wife to prove her contribution.  If she cannot prove the contribution, she does not get the extra $50,000.00.

Such was the case in Marriage of Orlando (2026) D088368.  In that case, the wife, Colleen, owned a home in Long Beach going back to before her 2006 marriage to the husband, Vincent.  Wife sold Long Beach in 2009 and netted $133,788.00.  In 2013, Colleen and Vincent purchased a home in Temecula as joint tenants.

The parties broke up in 2022.  At a 10-day trial (was it really worth it?), Coleen testified that the proceeds from Long Beach were used to contribute to a downpayment of $275,000.00 to $300,000.00 for Temecula.  There was evidence admitted at trial showing the escrow closing statement for Long Beach and the $133,788.00 check to Colleen.  But the rest of the evidence was sparse.  Coleen stated that she put the Long Beach money into “our bank account” but she was not certain which one of two Wells Fargo bank accounts the parties had received the $133,788.00.  She had no paper evidence of the actual deposit into a Wells Fargo account – just a copy of the check she got when Long Beach sold.

Colleen and Vincent purchased Temecula four years later.  Colleen was unable to show which bank account was used to make the down payment.  She presented no documentation of the transaction.  So, no evidence of where the Long Beach money went after it was received; and no paperwork showing the Long Beach money going into the Temecula house.

In its decision, the judge stated that Colleen was “entitled to a Family Code section 2640 reimbursement claim for her separate property contribution in the amount of $133,788.00”.

But Vincent appealed, contending that no substantial evidence supported the reimbursement award because Collee failed to produce any documentary proof tracing the 2013 purchase of Temecula to the proceeds from the 2009 sale of Long Beach.  By a 3-0 vote, the California Court of Appeal agreed and set aside the reimbursement award.

To understand this appeal, two things were not at issue.  Vincent agreed that the proceeds from Long Beach were indeed Colleen’s separate property.  And though the parties held title to Temecula as joint tenants, under Family Code section 2581, the home was to be treated as community property making Colleen eligible for a section 2640 reimbursement claim – if only she had the proof.

Colleen herself had admitted that the Wells Fargo account – whichever one we’re talking about—had other money besides the proceeds from the Long Beach sale.

The justices stated that “[a] spouse who commingles separate property with community property assumes the burden of keeping adequate records to trace the community property to a separate property source.”  “[M]ere oral evidence testimony of intent” will not work.

In this case, Colleen “claimed she deposited the funds into a commingled community Wells Fargo account, but she failed to identify the specific account; she did not provide any documentary evidence of the deposit; she did not reconstruct each separate property and community property deposit to and payment from the account; and she did not submit documentation of the funds used for the down payment on the Temecula home.”  But for purposes of section 2640, “[m]ere oral testimony of intent has been held to be inadequate to do the job in light of the general presumption that property acquired during a marriage is community”.

The bad news for Vincent, however, is that the section 2640 claim only concerned $133,788.00.  Half of $133,788.00 is $66,894.00.  As the winner of the appeal, Vincent is only entitled to recover his costs on appeal – not his legal fees.  And the legal fees probably ate up a lot of the $66,894.00 gain.  The trial itself was ten days but much of that, or most of that, was devoted to other issues not relevant to this appeal.  So I won’t go so far as to say that Vincent and Colleen spent ten days at trial arguing over $133,788.00.

In any event, the Orlando case was ordered not published.  So it cannot be used for precedent by trial judges or attorneys in California.  But it gives a good idea of how hard it can be to prove a section 2640 claim, especially because happily married people might not feel a need to keep detailed records of the types of transactions discussed here.  Things might have been different, though probably not, if the sale of Long Beach was immediately followed by the purchase of Temecula.  But remember, the transactions were separated by four years.  And then another nine years went by from the 2013 purchase of Temecula and the 2022 separation which led to the divorce.  What really might have made a difference is if the Long Beach sales proceeds were isolated in an account with no other money in it.  But some documentary evidence, more than was presented here, would have still been required.

The appellate decision was from Division One of the California Court of Appeal’s Fourth Appellate District in San Diego.  But the trial court was in Riverside County.

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